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ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples are perturbed inputs designed to fool machine learning mod-
els. Adversarial training injects such examples into training data to increase ro-
bustness. To scale this technique to large datasets, perturbations are crafted using
fast single-step methods that maximize a linear approximation of the model’s loss.
We show that this form of adversarial training converges to a degenerate global
minimum, wherein small curvature artifacts near the data points obfuscate a lin-
ear approximation of the loss. The model thus learns to generate weak perturba-
tions, rather than defend against strong ones. As a result, we find that adversarial
training remains vulnerable to black-box attacks, where we transfer perturbations
computed on undefended models, as well as to a powerful novel single-step attack
that escapes the non-smooth vicinity of the input data via a small random step.
We further introduce Ensemble Adversarial Training, a technique that augments
training data with perturbations transferred from other models. On ImageNet,
Ensemble Adversarial Training yields models with strong robustness to black-box
attacks. In particular, our most robust model won the first round of the NIPS 2017
competition on Defenses against Adversarial Attacks (Kurakin et al., 2017c).
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models are often vulnerable to adversarial examples, maliciously perturbed
inputs designed to mislead a model at test time (Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2014b; Papernot et al., 2016a). Furthermore, Szegedy et al. (2013) showed that these inputs
transfer across models: the same adversarial example is often misclassified by different models,
thus enabling simple black-box attacks on deployed models (Papernot et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017).
Adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2013) increases robustness by augmenting training data with
adversarial examples. Madry et al. (2017) showed that adversarially trained models can be made
robust to white-box attacks (i.e., with knowledge of the model parameters) if the perturbations com-
puted during training closely maximize the model’s loss. However, prior attempts at scaling this
approach to ImageNet-scale tasks (Deng et al., 2009) have proven unsuccessful (Kurakin et al.,
2017b).
It is thus natural to ask whether it is possible, at scale, to achieve robustness against the class of
black-box adversaries Towards this goal, Kurakin et al. (2017b) adversarially trained an Inception
v3 model (Szegedy et al., 2016b) on ImageNet using a “single-step” attack based on a linearization
of the model’s loss (Goodfellow et al., 2014b). Their trained model is robust to single-step perturba-
tions but remains vulnerable to more costly “multi-step” attacks. Yet, Kurakin et al. (2017b) found
that these attacks fail to reliably transfer between models, and thus concluded that the robustness of
their model should extend to black-box adversaries. Surprisingly, we show that this is not the case.
∗Part of the work was done while the author was at Google Brain.
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We demonstrate, formally and empirically, that adversarial training with single-step methods admits
a degenerate global minimum, wherein the model’s loss can not be reliably approximated by a linear
function. Specifically, we find that the model’s decision surface exhibits sharp curvature near the
data points, thus degrading attacks based on a single gradient computation. In addition to the model
of Kurakin et al. (2017b), we reveal similar overfitting in an adversarially trained Inception ResNet
v2 model (Szegedy et al., 2016a), and a variety of models trained on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998).
We harness this result in two ways. First, we show that adversarially trained models using single-step
methods remain vulnerable to simple attacks. For black-box adversaries, we find that perturbations
crafted on an undefended model often transfer to an adversarially trained one. We also introduce a
simple yet powerful single-step attack that applies a small random perturbation—to escape the non-
smooth vicinity of the data point—before linearizing the model’s loss. While seemingly weaker than
the Fast Gradient Sign Method of Goodfellow et al. (2014b), our attack significantly outperforms it
for a same perturbation norm, for models trained with or without adversarial training.
Second, we propose Ensemble Adversarial Training, a training methodology that incorporates per-
turbed inputs transferred from other pre-trained models. Our approach decouples adversarial exam-
ple generation from the parameters of the trained model, and increases the diversity of perturbations
seen during training. We train Inception v3 and Inception ResNet v2 models on ImageNet that ex-
hibit increased robustness to adversarial examples transferred from other holdout models, using var-
ious single-step and multi-step attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Kurakin
et al., 2017a; Madry et al., 2017). We also show that our methods globally reduce the dimensionality
of the space of adversarial examples (Trame`r et al., 2017). Our Inception ResNet v2 model won the
first round of the NIPS 2017 competition on Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks (Kurakin et al.,
2017c), where it was evaluated on other competitors’ attacks in a black-box setting.1
2 RELATED WORK
Various defensive techniques against adversarial examples in deep neural networks have been pro-
posed (Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Luo et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016c; Nayebi & Ganguli, 2017; Cisse
et al., 2017) and many remain vulnerable to adaptive attackers (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a;b; Baluja
& Fischer, 2017). Adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin
et al., 2017b; Madry et al., 2017) appears to hold the greatest promise for learning robust models.
Madry et al. (2017) show that adversarial training on MNIST yields models that are robust to white-
box attacks, if the adversarial examples used in training closely maximize the model’s loss. More-
over, recent works by Sinha et al. (2018), Raghunathan et al. (2018) and Kolter & Wong (2017)
even succeed in providing certifiable robustness for small perturbations on MNIST. As we argue in
Appendix C, the MNIST dataset is peculiar in that there exists a simple “closed-form” denoising
procedure (namely feature binarization) which leads to similarly robust models without adversarial
training. This may explain why robustness to white-box attacks is hard to scale to tasks such as Im-
ageNet (Kurakin et al., 2017b). We believe that the existence of a simple robust baseline for MNIST
can be useful for understanding some limitations of adversarial training techniques.
Szegedy et al. (2013) found that adversarial examples transfer between models, thus enabling black-
box attacks on deployed models. Papernot et al. (2017) showed that black-box attacks could succeed
with no access to training data, by exploiting the target model’s predictions to extract (Trame`r et al.,
2016) a surrogate model. Some prior works have hinted that adversarially trained models may
remain vulnerable to black-box attacks: Goodfellow et al. (2014b) found that an adversarial maxout
network on MNIST has slightly higher error on transferred examples than on white-box examples.
Papernot et al. (2017) further showed that a model trained on small perturbations can be evaded
by transferring perturbations of larger magnitude. Our finding that adversarial training degrades
the accuracy of linear approximations of the model’s loss is as an instance of a gradient-masking
phenomenon (Papernot et al., 2016b), which affects other defensive techniques (Papernot et al.,
2016c; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Nayebi & Ganguli, 2017; Brendel & Bethge, 2017; Athalye et al.,
2018).
1We publicly released our model after the first round, and it could thereafter be targeted using white-box
attacks. Nevertheless, a majority of the top submissions in the final round, e.g. (Xie et al., 2018) built upon our
released model.
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3 THE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING FRAMEWORK
We consider a classification task with data x ∈ [0, 1]d and labels ytrue ∈ Zk sampled from a distri-
bution D. We identify a model with an hypothesis h from a spaceH. On input x, the model outputs
class scores h(x) ∈ Rk. The loss function used to train the model, e.g., cross-entropy, is L(h(x), y).
3.1 THREAT MODEL
For some target model h ∈ H and inputs (x, ytrue) the adversary’s goal is to find an adversarial
example xadv such that xadv and x are “close” yet the model misclassifies xadv. We consider the well-
studied class of `∞ bounded adversaries (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Madry et al., 2017) that, given
some budget , output examples xadv where ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ . As we comment in Appendix C.1,
`∞ robustness is of course not an end-goal for secure ML. We use this standard model to showcase
limitations of prior adversarial training methods, and evaluate our proposed improvements.
We distinguish between white-box adversaries that have access to the target model’s parameters
(i.e., h), and black-box adversaries with only partial information about the model’s inner workings.
Formal definitions for these adversaries are in Appendix A. Although security against white-box
attacks is the stronger notion (and the one we ideally want ML models to achieve), black-box security
is a reasonable and more tractable goal for deployed ML models.
3.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Following Madry et al. (2017), we consider an adversarial variant of standard Empirical Risk Mini-
mization (ERM), where our aim is to minimize the risk over adversarial examples:
h∗ = argmin
h∈H
E
(x,ytrue)∼D
[
max
‖xadv−x‖∞≤
L(h(xadv), ytrue)
]
. (1)
Madry et al. (2017) argue that adversarial training has a natural interpretation in this context, where
a given attack (see below) is used to approximate solutions to the inner maximization problem, and
the outer minimization problem corresponds to training over these examples. Note that the original
formulation of adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b), which we use
in our experiments, trains on both the “clean” examples x and adversarial examples xadv.
We consider three algorithms to generate adversarial examples with bounded `∞ norm. The first two
are single-step (i.e., they require a single gradient computation); the third is iterative—it computes
multiple gradient updates. We enforce xadv ∈ [0, 1]d by clipping all components of xadv.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). This method (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) linearizes the inner
maximization problem in (1):
xadvFGSM := x+ ε · sign (∇xL(h(x), ytrue)) . (2)
Single-Step Least-Likely Class Method (Step-LL). This variant of FGSM introduced by Kurakin
et al. (2017a;b) targets the least-likely class, yLL = argmin{h(x)}:
xadvLL := x− ε · sign (∇xL(h(x), yLL)) . (3)
Although this attack only indirectly tackles the inner maximization in (1), Kurakin et al. (2017b)
find it to be the most effective for adversarial training on ImageNet.
Iterative Attack (I-FGSM or Iter-LL). This method iteratively applies the FGSM or Step-LL k
times with step-size α ≥ /k and projects each step onto the `∞ ball of norm  around x. It uses
projected gradient descent to solve the maximization in (1). For fixed , iterative attacks induce
higher error rates than single-step attacks, but transfer at lower rates (Kurakin et al., 2017a;b).
3.3 A DEGENERATE GLOBAL MINIMUM FOR SINGLE-STEP ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
When performing adversarial training with a single-step attack (e.g., the FGSM or Step-LL methods
above), we approximate Equation (1) by replacing the solution to the inner maximization problem
3
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in with the output of the single-step attack (e.g., xadvFGSM in (2)). That is, we solve
h∗ = argmin
h∈H
E
(x,ytrue)∼D
[
L(h(xadvFGSM), ytrue)
]
. (4)
For model families H with high expressive power, this alternative optimization problem admits at
least two substantially different global minima h∗:
• For an input x from D, there is no xadv close to x (in `∞ norm) that induces a high loss. That is,
L(h∗(xadvFGSM), ytrue) ≈ max
‖xadv−x‖∞≤
L(h∗(xadv), ytrue)] ≈ 0 . (5)
In other words, h∗ is robust to all `∞ bounded perturbations.
• The minimizer h∗ is a model for which the approximation method underlying the attack (i.e.,
linearization in our case) poorly fits the model’s loss function. That is,
L(h∗(xadvFGSM), ytrue) max
‖xadv−x‖∞≤
L(h∗(xadv), ytrue)] . (6)
Thus the attack when applied to h∗ produces samples xadv that are far from optimal.
Note that this second “degenerate” minimum can be more subtle than a simple case of overfitting to
samples produced from single-step attacks. Indeed, we show in Section 4.1 that single-step attacks
applied to adversarially trained models create “adversarial” examples that are easy to classify even
for undefended models. Thus, adversarial training does not simply learn to resist the particular attack
used during training, but actually to make that attack perform worse overall. This phenomenon
relates to the notion of Reward Hacking (Amodei et al., 2016) wherein an agent maximizes its
formal objective function via unintended behavior that fails to captures the designer’s true intent.
3.4 ENSEMBLE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
The degenerate minimum described in Section 3.3 is attainable because the learned model’s param-
eters influence the quality of both the minimization and maximization in (1). One solution is to use
a stronger adversarial example generation process, at a high performance cost (Madry et al., 2017).
Alternatively, Baluja & Fischer (2017) suggest training an adversarial generator model as in the
GAN framework (Goodfellow et al., 2014a). The power of this generator is likely to require careful
tuning, to avoid similar degenerate minima (where the generator or classifier overpowers the other).
We propose a conceptually simpler approach to decouple the generation of adversarial examples
from the model being trained, while simultaneously drawing an explicit connection with robustness
to black-box adversaries. Our method, which we call Ensemble Adversarial Training, augments a
model’s training data with adversarial examples crafted on other static pre-trained models. Intu-
itively, as adversarial examples transfer between models, perturbations crafted on an external model
are good approximations for the maximization problem in (1). Moreover, the learned model can
not influence the “strength” of these adversarial examples. As a result, minimizing the training loss
implies increased robustness to black-box attacks from some set of models.
Domain Adaptation with multiple sources. We can draw a connection between Ensemble Adver-
sarial Training and multiple-source Domain Adaptation (Mansour et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012).
In Domain Adaptation, a model trained on data sampled from one or more source distributions
S1, . . . ,Sk is evaluated on samples x from a different target distribution T .
Let Ai be an adversarial distribution obtained by sampling (x, ytrue) from D, computing an adver-
sarial example xadv for some model such that ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ , and outputting (xadv, ytrue). In
Ensemble Adversarial Training, the source distributions are D (the clean data) and A1, . . . ,Ak (the
attacks overs the currently trained model and the static pre-trained models). The target distribution
takes the form of an unseen black-box adversary A∗. Standard generalization bounds for Domain
Adaptation (Mansour et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012) yield the following result.
Theorem 1 (informal). Let h∗ ∈ H be a model learned with Ensemble Adversarial Training and
static black-box adversaries A1, . . . ,Ak. Then, if h∗ is robust against the black-box adversaries
A1, . . .Ak used at training time, then h∗ has bounded error on attacks from a future black-box
adversary A∗, if A∗ is not “much stronger”, on average, than the static adversaries A1, . . . ,Ak.
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² 1
0
3
²2
0
3
0. 7
1. 3
1. 9
(b) Zoom in for small 1, 2.
Figure 1: Gradient masking in single-step adversarial training. We plot the loss of model v3adv
on points x∗ = x+1 ·g+2 ·g⊥, where g is the signed gradient and g⊥ is an orthogonal adversarial
direction. Plot (b) is a zoom of (a) near x. The gradient poorly approximates the global loss.
We give a formal statement of this result and of the assumptions on A∗ in Appendix B. Of course,
ideally we would like guarantees against arbitrary future adversaries. For very low-dimensional
tasks (e.g., MNIST), stronger guarantees are within reach for specific classes of adversaries (e.g.,
`∞ bounded perturbations (Madry et al., 2017; Sinha et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Kolter
& Wong, 2017)), yet they also fail to extend to other adversaries not considered at training time (see
Appendix C.1 for a discussion). For ImageNet-scale tasks, stronger formal guarantees appear out of
reach, and we thus resort to an experimental assessment of the robustness of Ensemble Adversarially
Trained models to various non-interactive black-box adversaries in Section 4.2.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We show the existence of a degenerate minimum, as described in Section 3.3, for the adversar-
ially trained Inception v3 model of Kurakin et al. (2017b). Their model (denoted v3adv) was
trained on a Step-LL attack with  ≤ 16/256. We also adversarially train an Inception ResNet
v2 model (Szegedy et al., 2016a) using the same setup. We denote this model by IRv2adv. We refer
the reader to (Kurakin et al., 2017b) for details on the adversarial training procedure.
We first measure the approximation-ratio of the Step-LL attack for the inner maximization in (1).
As we do not know the true maximum, we lower-bound it using an iterative attack. For 1,000
random test points, we find that for a standard Inception v3 model, step-LL gets within 19% of
the optimum loss on average. This attack is thus a good candidate for adversarial training. Yet,
for the v3adv model, the approximation ratio drops to 7%, confirming that the learned model is less
amenable to linearization. We obtain similar results for Inception ResNet v2 models. The ratio is
17% for a standard model, and 8% for IRv2adv. Similarly, we look at the cosine similarity between
the perturbations given by a single-step and multi-step attack. The more linear the model, the more
similar we expect both perturbations to be. The average similarity drops from 0.13 for Inception v3
to 0.02 for v3adv. This effect is not due to the decision surface of v3adv being “too flat” near the data
points: the average gradient norm is larger for v3adv (0.17) than for the standard v3 model (0.10).
We visualize this “gradient-masking” effect (Papernot et al., 2016b) by plotting the loss of v3adv
on examples x∗ = x + 1 · g + 2 · g⊥, where g is the signed gradient of model v3adv and g⊥ is a
signed vector orthogonal to g. Looking forward to Section 4.1, we actually chose g⊥ to be the signed
gradient of another Inception model, from which adversarial examples transfer to v3adv. Figure 1
shows that the loss is highly curved in the vicinity of the data point x, and that the gradient poorly
reflects the global loss landscape. Similar plots for additional data points are in Figure 4.
We show similar results for adversarially trained MNIST models in Appendix C.2. On this task,
input dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) mitigates adversarial training’s overfitting problem, in some
cases. Presumably, the random input mask diversifies the perturbations seen during training (dropout
at intermediate layers does not mitigate the overfitting effect). Mishkin et al. (2017) find that input
dropout significantly degrades accuracy on ImageNet, so we did not include it in our experiments.
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Table 1: Error rates (in %) of adversarial examples transferred between models. We use Step-
LL with  = 16/256 for 10,000 random test inputs. Diagonal elements represent a white-box attack.
The best attack for each target appears in bold. Similar results for MNIST models appear in Table 7.
Source
Target v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
v4 60.2 39.2 31.1 36.6 30.9
v3 43.8 69.6 36.4 42.1 35.1
v3adv 36.3 35.6 26.6 35.2 35.9
IRv2 38.0 38.0 30.8 50.7 31.9
IRv2adv 31.0 30.3 25.7 30.6 21.4
Top 1
Source
Target v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
v4 31.0 14.9 10.2 13.6 9.9
v3 18.7 42.7 13.0 17.8 12.8
v3adv 13.6 13.5 9.0 13.0 14.5
IRv2 14.1 14.8 9.9 24.0 10.6
IRv2adv 10.3 10.5 7.7 10.4 5.8
Top 5
4.1 ATTACKS AGAINST ADVERSARIALLY TRAINED NETWORKS
Kurakin et al. (2017b) found their adversarially trained model to be robust to various single-step
attacks. They conclude that this robustness should translate to attacks transferred from other models.
As we have shown, the robustness to single-step attacks is actually misleading, as the model has
learned to degrade the information contained in the model’s gradient. As a consequence, we find that
the v3adv model is substantially more vulnerable to single-step attacks than Kurakin et al. (2017b)
predicted, both in a white-box and black-box setting. The same holds for the IRv2adv model.
In addition to the v3adv and IRv2adv models, we consider standard Inception v3, Inception v4 and
Inception ResNet v2 models. These models are available in the TensorFlow-Slim library (Abadi
et al., 2015). We describe similar results for a variety of models trained on MNIST in Appendix C.2.
Black-box attacks. Table 1 shows error rates for single-step attacks transferred between models.
We compute perturbations on one model (the source) and transfer them to all others (the targets).
When the source and target are the same, the attack is white-box. Adversarial training greatly
increases robustness to white-box single-step attacks, but incurs a higher error rate in a black-box
setting. Thus, the robustness gain observed when evaluating defended models in isolation is mislead-
ing. Given the ubiquity of this pitfall among proposed defenses against adversarial examples (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017a; Brendel & Bethge, 2017; Papernot et al., 2016b), we advise researchers to always
consider both white-box and black-box adversaries when evaluating defensive strategies. Notably,
a similar discrepancy between white-box and black-box attacks was recently observed in Buckman
et al. (2018).
Attacks crafted on adversarial models are found to be weaker even against undefended models (i.e.,
when using v3adv or IRv2adv as source, the attack transfers with lower probability). This confirms
our intuition from Section 3.3: adversarial training does not just overfit to perturbations that affect
standard models, but actively degrades the linear approximation underlying the single-step attack.
A new randomized single-step attack. The loss function visualization in Figure 1 shows that
sharp curvature artifacts localized near the data points can mask the true direction of steepest ascent.
We thus suggest to prepend single-step attacks by a small random step, in order to “escape” the
non-smooth vicinity of the data point before linearizing the model’s loss. Our new attack, called
R+FGSM (alternatively, R+Step-LL), is defined as follows, for parameters  and α (where α < ):
xadv = x′ + (ε− α) · sign (∇x′J(x′, ytrue)) , where x′ = x+ α · sign(N (0d, Id)) . (7)
Note that the attack requires a single gradient computation. The R+FGSM is a computationally
efficient alternative to iterative methods that have high success rates in a white-box setting. Our
attack can be seen as a single-step variant of the general PGD method from (Madry et al., 2017).
Table 2 compares error rates for the Step-LL and R+Step-LL methods (with  = 16/256 and
α = /2). The extra random step yields a stronger attack for all models, even those without ad-
versarial training. This suggests that a model’s loss function is generally less smooth near the data
points. We further compared the R+Step-LL attack to a two-step Iter-LL attack, which computes
two gradient steps. Surprisingly, we find that for the adversarially trained Inception v3 model, the
R+Step-LL attack is stronger than the two-step Iter-LL attack. That is, the local gradients learned by
the adversarially trained model are worse than random directions for finding adversarial examples!
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Table 2: Error rates (in %) for Step-LL, R+Step-LL and a two-step Iter-LL on ImageNet. We
use  = 16/256, α = /2 on 10,000 random test inputs. R+FGSM results on MNIST are in Table 7.
Step-LL
R+Step-LL
Iter-LL(2)
v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
60.2 69.6 26.6 50.7 21.4
70.5 80.0 64.8 56.3 37.5
78.5 86.3 58.3 69.9 41.6
Top 1
v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
31.0 42.7 9.0 24.0 5.8
42.8 57.1 37.1 29.3 15.0
56.2 70.2 29.6 45.4 16.5
Top 5
Table 3: Models used for Ensemble Adversarial Training on ImageNet. The ResNets (He et al.,
2016) use either 50 or 101 layers. IncRes stands for Inception ResNet (Szegedy et al., 2016a).
Trained Model Pre-trained Models Holdout Models
Inception v3 (v3adv-ens3) Inception v3, ResNet v2 (50)
{ Inception v4
ResNet v1 (50)
ResNet v2 (101)
}
Inception v3 (v3adv-ens4) Inception v3, ResNet v2 (50), IncRes v2
IncRes v2 (IRv2adv-ens) Inception v3, IncRes v2
We find that the addition of this random step hinders transferability (see Table 9). We also tried
adversarial training using R+FGSM on MNIST, using a similar approach as (Madry et al., 2017).
We adversarially train a CNN (model A in Table 5) for 100 epochs, and attain > 90.0% accuracy
on R+FGSM samples. However, training on R+FGSM provides only little robustness to iterative
attacks. For the PGD attack of (Madry et al., 2017) with 20 steps, the model attains 18.0% accuracy.
4.2 ENSEMBLE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
We now evaluate our Ensemble Adversarial Training strategy described in Section 3.4. We recall
our intuition: by augmenting training data with adversarial examples crafted from static pre-trained
models, we decouple the generation of adversarial examples from the model being trained, so as to
avoid the degenerate minimum described in Section 3.3. Moreover, our hope is that robustness to
attacks transferred from some fixed set of models will generalize to other black-box adversaries.
We train Inception v3 and Inception ResNet v2 models (Szegedy et al., 2016a) on ImageNet, using
the pre-trained models shown in Table 3. In each training batch, we rotate the source of adversarial
examples between the currently trained model and one of the pre-trained models. We select the
source model at random in each batch, to diversify examples across epochs. The pre-trained models’
gradients can be precomputed for the full training set. The per-batch cost of Ensemble Adversarial
Training is thus lower than that of standard adversarial training: using our method with n − 1
pre-trained models, only every nth batch requires a forward-backward pass to compute adversarial
gradients. We use synchronous distributed training on 50 machines, with minibatches of size 16 (we
did not pre-compute gradients, and thus lower the batch size to fit all models in memory). Half of
the examples in a minibatch are replaced by Step-LL examples. As in Kurakin et al. (2017b), we
use RMSProp with a learning rate of 0.045, decayed by a factor of 0.94 every two epochs.
To evaluate how robustness to black-box attacks generalizes across models, we transfer various
attacks crafted on three different holdout models (see Table 3), as well as on an ensemble of these
models (as in Liu et al. (2017)). We use the Step-LL, R+Step-LL, FGSM, I-FGSM and the PGD
attack from Madry et al. (2017) using the hinge-loss function from Carlini & Wagner (2017a). Our
results are in Table 4. For each model, we report the worst-case error rate over all black-box attacks
transfered from each of the holdout models (20 attacks in total). Results for MNIST are in Table 8.
Convergence speed. Convergence of Ensemble Adversarial Training is slower than for standard
adversarial training, a result of training on “hard” adversarial examples and lowering the batch size.
Kurakin et al. (2017b) report that after 187 epochs (150k iterations with minibatches of size 32),
the v3adv model achieves 78% accuracy. Ensemble Adversarial Training for models v3adv-ens3 and
v3adv-ens4 converges after 280 epochs (450k iterations with minibatches of size 16). The Inception
ResNet v2 model is trained for 175 epochs, where a baseline model converges at around 160 epochs.
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Table 4: Error rates (in %) for Ensemble Adversarial Training on ImageNet. Error rates on
clean data are computed over the full test set. For 10,000 random test set inputs, and  = 16/256, we
report error rates on white-box Step-LL and the worst-case error over a series of black-box attacks
(Step-LL, R+Step-LL, FGSM, I-FGSM, PGD) transferred from the holdout models in Table 3. For
both architectures, we mark methods tied for best in bold (based on 95% confidence).
Top 1 Top 5
Model Clean Step-LL Max. Black-Box Clean Step-LL Max. Black-Box
v3 22.0 69.6 51.2 6.1 42.7 24.5
v3adv 22.0 26.6 40.8 6.1 9.0 17.4
v3adv-ens3 23.6 30.0 34.0 7.6 10.1 11.2
v3adv-ens4 24.2 43.3 33.4 7.8 19.4 10.7
IRv2 19.6 50.7 44.4 4.8 24.0 17.8
IRv2adv 19.8 21.4 34.5 4.9 5.8 11.7
IRv2adv-ens 20.2 26.0 27.0 5.1 7.6 7.9
White-box attacks. For both architectures, the models trained with Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing are slightly less accurate on clean data, compared to standard adversarial training. Our models
are also more vulnerable to white-box single-step attacks, as they were only partially trained on
such perturbations. Note that for v3adv-ens4, the proportion of white-box Step-LL samples seen dur-
ing training is 1/4 (instead of 1/3 for model v3adv-ens3). The negative impact on the robustness to
white-box attacks is large, for only a minor gain in robustness to transferred samples. Thus it ap-
pears that while increasing the diversity of adversarial examples seen during training can provide
some marginal improvement, the main benefit of Ensemble Adversarial Training is in decoupling
the attacks from the model being trained, which was the goal we stated in Section 3.4.
Ensemble Adversarial Training is not robust to white-box Iter-LL and R+Step-LL samples: the error
rates are similar to those for the v3adv model, and omitted for brevity (see Kurakin et al. (2017b) for
Iter-LL attacks and Table 2 for R+Step-LL attacks). Kurakin et al. (2017b) conjecture that larger
models are needed to attain robustness to such attacks. Yet, against black-box adversaries, these
attacks are only a concern insofar as they reliably transfer between models.
Black-box attacks. Ensemble Adversarial Training significantly boosts robustness to all attacks
transferred from the holdout models. For the IRv2adv-ens model, the accuracy loss (compared to
IRv2’s accuracy on clean data) is 7.4% (top 1) and 3.1% (top 5). We find that the strongest attacks
in our test suite (i.e., with highest transfer rates) are the FGSM attacks. Black-box R+Step-LL or
iterative attacks are less effective, as they do not transfer with high probability (see Kurakin et al.
(2017b) and Table 9). Attacking an ensemble of all three holdout models, as in Liu et al. (2017), did
not lead to stronger black-box attacks than when attacking the holdout models individually.
Our results have little variance with respect to the attack parameters (e.g., smaller ) or to the use of
other holdout models for black-box attacks (e.g., we obtain similar results by attacking the v3adv-ens3
and v3adv-ens4 models with the IRv2 model). We also find that v3adv-ens3 is not vulnerable to pertur-
bations transferred from v3adv-ens4. We obtain similar results on MNIST (see Appendix C.2), thus
demonstrating the applicability of our approach to different datasets and model architectures.
The NIPS 2017 competition on adversarial examples. Our Inception ResNet v2 model was in-
cluded as a baseline defense in the NIPS 2017 competition on Adversarial Examples (Kurakin et al.,
2017c). Participants of the attack track submitted non-interactive black-box attacks that produce
adversarial examples with bounded `∞ norm. Models submitted to the defense track were evaluated
on all attacks over a subset of the ImageNet test set. The score of a defense was defined as the
average accuracy of the model over all adversarial examples produced by all attacks.
Our IRv2adv-ens model finished 1
st among 70 submissions in the first development round, with a score
of 95.3% (the second placed defense scored 89.9%). The test data was intentionally chosen as an
“easy” subset of ImageNet. Our model achieved 97.9% accuracy on the clean test data.
After the first round, we released our model publicly, which enabled other users to launch white-box
attacks against it. Nevertheless, a majority of the final submissions built upon our released model.
The winning submission (team “liaofz” with a score of 95.3%) made use of a novel adversarial
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Figure 2: The dimensionality of the adversarial cone. For 500 correctly classified points x, and
for  ∈ {4, 10, 16}, we plot the probability that we find at least k orthogonal vectors ri such that
‖ri‖∞ =  and x + ri is misclassified. For  ≥ 10, model v3adv shows a bimodal phenomenon:
most points x either have 0 adversarial directions or more than 90.
denoising technique. The second placed defense (team “cihangxie” with a score of 92.4%) prepends
our IRv2adv-ens model with random padding and resizing of the input image (Xie et al., 2018).
It is noteworthy that the defenses that incorporated Ensemble Adversarial Training faired better
against the worst-case black-box adversary. Indeed, although very robust on average, the winning
defense achieved as low as 11.8% accuracy on some attacks. The best defense under this metric
(team “rafaelmm” which randomly perturbed images before feeding them to our IRv2adv-ens model)
achieved at least 53.6% accuracy against all submitted attacks, including the attacks that explicitly
targeted our released model in a white-box setting.
Decreasing gradient masking. Ensemble Adversarial Training decreases the magnitude of the
gradient masking effect described previously. For the v3adv-ens3 and v3adv-ens4 models, we find that
the loss incurred on a Step-LL attack gets within respectively 13% and 18% of the optimum loss
(we recall that for models v3 and v3adv, the approximation ratio was respectively 19% and 7%).
Similarly, for the IRv2adv-ens model, the ratio improves from 8% (for IRv2adv) to 14%. As expected,
not solely training on a white-box single-step attack reduces gradient masking. We also verify that
after Ensemble Adversarial Training, a two-step iterative attack outperforms the R+Step-LL attack
from Section 4.1, thus providing further evidence that these models have meaningful gradients.
Finally, we revisit the “Gradient-Aligned Adversarial Subspace” (GAAS) method of Trame`r et al.
(2017). Their method estimates the size of the space of adversarial examples in the vicinity of a
point, by finding a set of orthogonal perturbations of norm  that are all adversarial. We note that
adversarial perturbations do not technically form a “subspace” (e.g., the 0 vector is not adversarial).
Rather, they may form a “cone”, the dimension of which varies as we increase . By linearizing
the loss function, estimating the dimensionality of this cone reduces to finding vectors ri that are
strongly aligned with the model’s gradient g = ∇xL(h(x), ytrue). Trame`r et al. (2017) give a method
that finds k orthogonal vectors ri that satisfy g
>ri ≥ ·‖g‖2 · 1√k (this bound is tight). We extend this
result to the `∞ norm, an open question in Trame`r et al. (2017). In Section E, we give a randomized
combinatorial construction (Colbourn, 2010), that finds k orthogonal vectors ri satisfying ‖ri‖∞ =
 and E
[
g>ri
] ≥  · ‖g‖1 · 1√k . We show that this result is tight as well.
For models v3, v3adv and v3adv-ens3, we select 500 correctly classified test points. For each x, we
search for a maximal number of orthogonal adversarial perturbations ri with ‖ri‖∞ = . We limit
our search to k ≤ 100 directions per point. The results are in Figure 2. For  ∈ {4, 10, 16}, we plot
the proportion of points that have at least k orthogonal adversarial perturbations. For a fixed , the
value of k can be interpreted as the dimension of a “slice” of the cone of adversarial examples near
a data point. For the standard Inception v3 model, we find over 50 orthogonal adversarial directions
for 30% of the points. The v3adv model shows a curious bimodal phenomenon for  ≥ 10: for most
points (≈ 80%), we find no adversarial direction aligned with the gradient, which is consistent with
the gradient masking effect. Yet, for most of the remaining points, the adversarial space is very
high-dimensional (k ≥ 90). Ensemble Adversarial Training yields a more robust model, with only
a small fraction of points near a large adversarial space.
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Previous work on adversarial training at scale has produced encouraging results, showing strong
robustness to (single-step) adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin et al., 2017b).
Yet, these results are misleading, as the adversarially trained models remain vulnerable to simple
black-box and white-box attacks. Our results, generic with respect to the application domain, sug-
gest that adversarial training can be improved by decoupling the generation of adversarial examples
from the model being trained. Our experiments with Ensemble Adversarial Training show that the
robustness attained to attacks from some models transfers to attacks from other models.
We did not consider black-box adversaries that attack a model via other means than by transferring
examples from a local model. For instance, generative techniques (Baluja & Fischer, 2017) might
provide an avenue for stronger attacks. Yet, a recent work by Xiao et al. (2018) found Ensemble
Adversarial Training to be resilient to such attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10, and often attaining
higher robustness than models that were adversarially trained on iterative attacks.
Moreover, interactive adversaries (see Appendix A) could try to exploit queries to the target model’s
prediction function in their attack, as demonstrated in Papernot et al. (2017). If queries to the target
model yield prediction confidences, an adversary can estimate the target’s gradient at a given point
(e.g., using finite-differences as in Chen et al. (2017)) and fool the target with our R+FGSM attack.
Note that if queries only return the predicted label, the attack does not apply. Exploring the impact of
these classes of black-box attacks and evaluating their scalability to complex tasks is an interesting
avenue for future work.
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A THREAT MODEL: FORMAL DEFINITIONS
We provide formal definitions for the threat model introduced in Section 3.1. In the following,
we explicitly identify the hypothesis space H that a model belongs to as describing the model’s
architecture. We consider a target model h ∈ H trained over inputs (x, ytrue) sampled from a data
distribution D. More precisely, we write
h← train(H, Xtrain, Ytrain, r) ,
where train is a randomized training procedure that takes in a description of the model architec-
tureH, a training set Xtrain, Ytrain sampled from D, and randomness r.
Given a set of test inputsX,Y = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} fromD and a budget  > 0, an adversary
A produces adversarial examples Xadv = {xadv1 , . . . , xadvm }, such that ‖xi − xadvi ‖∞ ≤  for all
i ∈ [1,m]. We evaluate success of the attack as the error rate of the target model over Xadv:
1
m
m∑
i=1
1(argmaxh(xadvi ) 6= yi) .
We assume A can sample inputs according to the data distribution D. We define three adversaries.
Definition 2 (White-Box Adversary). For a target model h ∈ H, a white-box adversary is given
access to all elements of the training procedure, that is train (the training algorithm), H (the
model architecture), the training data Xtrain, Ytrain, the randomness r and the parameters h. The
adversary can use any attack (e.g., those in Section 3.2) to find adversarial inputs.
White-box access to the internal model weights corresponds to a very strong adversarial model. We
thus also consider the following relaxed and arguably more realistic notion of a black-box adversary.
Definition 3 (Non-Interactive Black-Box Adversary). For a target model h ∈ H, a non-interactive
black-box adversary only gets access to train (the target model’s training procedure) and H (the
model architecture). The adversary can sample from the data distribution D, and uses a local
algorithm to craft adversarial examples Xadv.
Attacks based on transferability (Szegedy et al., 2013) fall in this category, wherein the adversary
selects a procedure train′ and model architectureH′, trains a local model h′ overD, and computes
adversarial examples on its local model h′ using white-box attack strategies.
Most importantly, a black-box adversary does not learn the randomness r used to train the target,
nor the target’s parameters h. The black-box adversaries in our paper are actually slightly stronger
than the ones defined above, in that they use the same training data Xtrain, Ytrain as the target model.
We provideA with the target’s training procedure train to capture knowledge of defensive strate-
gies applied at training time, e.g., adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014b) or ensemble adversarial training (see Section 4.2). For ensemble adversarial training,A also
knows the architectures of all pre-trained models. In this work, we always mount black-box attacks
that train a local model with a different architecture than the target model. We actually find that
black-box attacks on adversarially trained models are stronger in this case (see Table 1).
The main focus of our paper is on non-interactive black-box adversaries as defined above. For com-
pleteness, we also formalize a stronger notion of interactive black-box adversaries that additionally
issue prediction queries to the target model (Papernot et al., 2017). We note that in cases where ML
models are deployed as part of a larger system (e.g., a self driving car), an adversary may not have
direct access to the model’s query interface.
Definition 4 (Interactive Black-Box Adversary). For a target model h ∈ H, an interactive black-
box adversary only gets access to train (the target model’s training procedure) andH (the model
architecture). The adversary issues (adaptive) oracle queries to the target model. That is, for
arbitrary inputs x ∈ [0, 1]d, the adversary obtains y = argmaxh(x) and uses a local algorithm to
craft adversarial examples (given knowledge ofH, train, and tuples (x, y)).
Papernot et al. (2017) show that such attacks are possible even if the adversary only gets access to
a small number of samples from D. Note that if the target model’s prediction interface additionally
returns class scores h(x), interactive black-box adversaries could use queries to the target model to
estimate the model’s gradient (e.g., using finite differences) (Chen et al., 2017), and then apply the
attacks in Section 3.2. We further discuss interactive black-box attack strategies in Section 5.
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B GENERALIZATION BOUND FOR ENSEMBLE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
We provide a formal statement of Theorem 1 in Section 3.4, regarding the generalization guarantees
of Ensemble Adversarial Training. For simplicity, we assume that the model is trained solely on
adversarial examples computed on the pre-trained models (i.e., we ignore the clean training data and
the adversarial examples computed on the model being trained). Our results are easily extended to
also consider these data points.
LetD be the data distribution andA1, . . . ,Ak,A∗ be adversarial distributions where a sample (x, y)
is obtained by sampling (x, ytrue) from D, computing an xadv such that ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤  and
returning (xadv, ytrue). We assume the model is trained on N data points Ztrain, where Nk data points
are sampled from each distribution Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We denote Atrain = {A1, . . . ,Ak}. At test
time, the model is evaluated on adversarial examples from A∗.
For a model h ∈ H we define the empirical risk
Rˆ(h,Atrain) :=
1
N
∑
(x
adv
,ytrue)∈Ztrain
L(h(xadv), ytrue) , (8)
and the risk over the target distribution (or future adversary)
R(h,A∗) := E
(x
adv
,ytrue)∼A∗
[L(h(xadv), ytrue)] . (9)
We further define the average discrepancy distance (Mansour et al., 2009) between distributions Ai
and A∗ with respect to a hypothesis spaceH as
discH(Atrain,A∗) :=
1
k
k∑
i=1
sup
h1,h2∈H
∣∣∣∣EAi[1{h1(xadv)=h2(xadv)}]− EA∗[1{h1(xadv)=h2(xadv)}]
∣∣∣∣ . (10)
This quantity characterizes how “different” the future adversary is from the train-time adversaries.
Intuitively, the distance disc(Atrain,A∗) is small if the difference in robustness between two models
to the target attackA∗ is somewhat similar to the difference in robustness between these two models
to the attacks used for training (e.g., if the static black-box attacks Ai induce much higher error on
some model h1 than on another model h2, then the same should hold for the target attack A∗). In
other words, the ranking of the robustness of models h ∈ H should be similar for the attacks in
Atrain as for A∗.
Finally, let RN (H) be the average Rademacher complexity of the distributions A1, . . . ,Ak (Zhang
et al., 2012). Note that RN (H) → 0 as N → ∞. The following theorem is a corollary of Zhang
et al. (2012, Theorem 5.2):
Theorem 5. Assume that H is a function class consisting of bounded functions. Then, with proba-
bility at least 1− ,
sup
h∈H
|Rˆ(h,Atrain)−R(h,A∗)| ≤ discH(Atrain,A∗) + 2RN (H) +O
(√
ln(1/)
N
)
. (11)
Compared to the standard generalization bound for supervised learning, the generalization bound for
Domain Adaptation incorporates the extra term discH(Atrain,A∗) to capture the divergence between
the target and source distributions. In our context, this means that the model h∗ learned by Ensemble
Adversarial Training has guaranteed generalization bounds with respect to future adversaries that
are not “too different” from the ones used during training. Note that A∗ need not restrict itself to
perturbation with bounded `∞ norm for this result to hold.
C EXPERIMENTS ON MNIST
We re-iterate our ImageNet experiments on MNIST. For this simpler task, Madry et al. (2017) show
that training on iterative attacks conveys robustness to white-box attacks with bounded `∞ norm.
Our goal is not to attain similarly strong white-box robustness on MNIST, but to show that our ob-
servations on limitations of single-step adversarial training, extend to other datasets than ImageNet.
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Figure 3: Adversarial Examples on MNIST. (top) clean examples. (middle) inputs are rotated by
20° and 5 random pixels are flipped. (bottom) The I-FGSM with  = 0.3 is applied.
C.1 A NOTE ON `∞ ROBUSTNESS ON MNIST
The MNIST dataset is a simple baseline for assessing the potential of a defense, but the obtained
results do not always generalize to harder tasks. We suggest that this is because achieving robustness
to `∞ perturbations admits a simple “closed-form” solution, given the near-binary nature of the data.
Indeed, for an average MNIST image, over 80% of the pixels are in {0, 1} and only 6% are in the
range [0.2, 0.8]. Thus, for a perturbation with  ≤ 0.3, binarized versions of x and xadv can differ
in at most 6% of the input dimensions. By binarizing the inputs of a standard CNN trained without
adversarial training, we obtain a model that enjoys robustness similar to the model trained by Madry
et al. (2017). Concretely, for a white-box I-FGSM attack, we get at most 11.4% error.
The existence of such a simple robust representation begs the question of why learning a robust
model with adversarial training takes so much effort. Finding techniques to improve the performance
of adversarial training, even on simple tasks, could provide useful insights for more complex tasks
such as ImageNet, where we do not know of a similarly simple “denoising” procedure.
These positive results on MNIST for the `∞ norm also leave open the question of defining a general
norm for adversarial examples. Let us motivate the need for such a definition: we find that if we
first rotate an MNIST digit by 20°, and then use the I-FGSM, our rounding model and the model
from Madry et al. (2017) achieve only 65% accuracy (on “clean” rotated inputs, the error is < 5%).
If we further randomly “flip” 5 pixels per image, the accuracy of both models drops to under 50%.
Thus, we successfully evade the model by slightly extending the threat model (see Figure 3).
Of course, we could augment the training set with such perturbations (see Engstrom et al. (2017)).
An open question is whether we can enumerate all types of “adversarial” perturbations. In this
work, we focus on the `∞ norm to illustrate our findings on the limitations of single-step adversarial
training on ImageNet and MNIST, and to showcase the benefits of our Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing variant. Our approach can easily be extended to consider multiple perturbation metrics. We
leave such an evaluation to future work.
C.2 RESULTS
We repeat experiments from Section 4 on MNIST. We use the architectures in Table 5. We train a
standard model for 6 epochs, and an adversarial model with the FGSM ( = 0.3) for 12 epochs.
During adversarial training, we avoid the label leaking effect described by Kurakin et al. (2017b) by
using the model’s predicted class argmaxh(x) instead of the true label ytrue in the FGSM,
We first analyze the “degenerate” minimum of adversarial training, described in Section 3.3. For
each trained model, we compute the approximation-ratio of the FGSM for the inner maximization
problem in equation (1). That is, we compare the loss produced by the FGSM with the loss of a
Table 5: Neural network architectures used in this work for the MNIST dataset. Conv: convo-
lutional layer, FC: fully connected layer.
A B C D
Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128, 3, 3) + Tanh [FC(300) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)
]
×4Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Conv(64, 8, 8) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
Dropout(0.25) Conv(128, 6, 6) + Relu Conv(64, 3, 3) + Tanh FC + Softmax
FC(128) + Relu Conv(128, 5, 5) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) FC(128) + Relu
FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax
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Table 6: Approximation ratio between optimal loss and loss induced by single-step attack on
MNIST. Architecture B’ is the same as B without the input dropout layer.
A Aadv B Badv B
∗ B∗adv C Cadv D Dadv
17% 0% 25% 8% 23% 1% 25% 0% 49% 16%
strong iterative attack. The results appear in Table 6. As we can see, for all model architectures,
adversarial training degraded the quality of a linear approximation to the model’s loss.
We find that input dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) (i.e., randomly dropping a fraction of input fea-
tures during training) as used in architecture B limits this unwarranted effect of adversarial training.2
If we omit the input dropout (we call this architecture B∗) the single-step attack degrades signifi-
cantly. We discuss this effect in more detail below. For the fully connected architecture D, we find
that the learned model is very close to linear and thus also less prone to the degenerate solution to
the min-max problem, as we postulated in Section 3.3.
Attacks. Table 7 compares error rates of undefended and adversarially trained models on white-
box and black-box attacks, as in Section 4.1. Again, model B presents an anomaly. For all other
models, we corroborate our findings on ImageNet for adversarial training: (1) black-box attacks
trump white-box single-step attacks; (2) white-box single-step attacks are significantly stronger if
prepended by a random step. For model Badv, the opposite holds true. We believe this is because
input dropout increases diversity of attack samples similarly to Ensemble Adversarial Training.
Table 7: White-box and black-box attacks against standard and adversarially trained models.
For each model, the strongest single-step white-box and black box attacks are marked in bold.
white-box black-box
FGSM R+FGSM FGSMA FGSMB FGSMB* FGSMC FGSMD
A 64.7 69.7 - 61.5 53.2 46.8 41.5
Aadv 2.2 14.8 6.6 10.7 8.8 6.5 8.3
B 85.0 86.0 45.7 - 69.9 59.9 85.9
Badv 11.6 11.1 6.4 8.9 8.5 4.9 6.1
B∗ 75.7 74.1 44.3 72.8 - 46.0 62.6
B∗adv 4.3 40.6 16.1 14.7 15.0 17.9 9.1
C 81.8 81.8 40.2 55.8 49.5 - 59.4
Cadv 3.7 17.1 9.8 29.3 21.5 11.9 21.9
D 92.4 95.4 61.3 74.1 68.9 65.1 -
Dadv 25.5 47.5 32.1 30.5 29.3 28.2 21.8
While training with input dropout helps avoid the degradation of the single-step attack, it also sig-
nificantly delays convergence of the model. Indeed, model Badv retains relatively high error on
white-box FGSM examples. Adversarial training with input dropout can be seen as comparable to
training with a randomized single-step attack, as discussed in Section 4.1.
The positive effect of input dropout is architecture and dataset specific: Adding an input dropout
layer to models A, C and D confers only marginal benefit, and is outperformed by Ensemble Ad-
versarial Training, discussed below. Moreover, Mishkin et al. (2017) find that input dropout signifi-
cantly degrades accuracy on ImageNet. We thus did not incorporate it into our models on ImageNet.
Ensemble Adversarial Training. To evaluate Ensemble Adversarial Training 3.4, we train two
models per architecture. The first, denoted [A-D]adv-ens, uses a single pre-trained model of the same
type (i.e., Aadv-ens is trained on perturbations from another model A). The second model, denoted [A-
D]adv-ens3, uses 3 pre-trained models ({A,C,D} or {B,C,D}). We train all models for 12 epochs.
We evaluate our models on black-box attacks crafted on models A,B,C,D (for a fair comparison, we
do not use the same pre-trained models for evaluation, but retrain them with different random seeds).
2We thank Arjun Bhagoji, Bo Li and Dawn Song for this observation.
16
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2018
Table 8: Ensemble Adversarial Training on MNIST. For black-box robustness, we report the
maximum and average error rate over a suite of 12 attacks, comprised of the FGSM, I-FGSM and
PGD (Madry et al., 2017) attacks applied to models A,B,C and D. We use  = 16 in all cases. For
each model architecture, we mark the models tied for best (at a 95% confidence level) in bold.
Clean FGSM Max. Black Box Avg. Black Box
Aadv 0.8 2.2 10.8 7.7
Aadv-ens 0.8 7.0 6.6 5.2
Aadv-ens3 0.7 5.4 6.5 4.3
Badv 0.8 11.6 8.9 5.5
Badv-ens 0.7 10.5 6.8 5.3
Badv-ens3 0.8 14.0 8.8 5.1
Cadv 1.0 3.7 29.3 18.7
Cadv-ens 1.3 1.9 17.2 10.7
Cadv-ens3 1.4 3.6 14.5 8.4
Dadv 2.6 25.5 32.5 23.5
Dadv-ens 2.6 21.5 38.6 28.0
Dadv-ens3 2.6 29.4 29.8 15.6
The attacks we consider are the FGSM, I-FGSM and the PGD attack from Madry et al. (2017) with
the loss function from Carlini & Wagner (2017a)), all with  = 0.3. The results appear in Table 8.
For each model, we report the worst-case and average-case error rate over all black-box attacks.
Ensemble Adversarial Training significantly increases robustness to black-box attacks, except for
architecture B, which we previously found to not suffer from the same overfitting phenomenon
that affects the other adversarially trained networks. Nevertheless, model Badv-ens achieves slightly
better robustness to white-box and black-box attacks than Badv. In the majority of cases, we find
that using a single pre-trained model produces good results, but that the extra diversity of including
three pre-trained models can sometimes increase robustness even further. Our experiments confirm
our conjecture that robustness to black-box attacks generalizes across models. Indeed, we find that
when training with three external models, we attain very good robustness against attacks initiated
from models with the same architecture (as evidenced by the average error on our attack suite), but
also increased robustness to attacks initiated from the fourth holdout model
D TRANSFERABILITY OF RANDOMIZED SINGLE-STEP PERTURBATIONS.
In Section 4.1, we introduced the R+Step-LL attack, an extension of the Step-LL method that
prepends the attack with a small random perturbation. In Table 9, we evaluate the transferability
of R+Step-LL adversarial examples on ImageNet. We find that the randomized variant produces
perturbations that transfer at a much lower rate (see Table 1 for the deterministic variant).
Table 9: Error rates (in %) of randomized single-step attacks transferred between models on
ImageNet. We use R+Step-LL with  = 16/256, α = /2 for 10,000 random test set samples. The
white-box attack always outperforms black-box attacks.
Source
Target v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
v4 70.5 37.2 23.2 34.0 24.6
v3 42.6 80.0 26.7 38.5 27.6
v3adv 31.4 30.7 64.8 30.4 34.0
IRv2 36.2 35.7 23.0 56.3 24.6
IRv2adv 26.8 26.3 25.2 26.9 37.5
Top 1
Source
Target v4 v3 v3adv IRv2 IRv2adv
v4 42.8 14.3 6.3 11.9 6.9
v3 18.0 57.1 8.0 15.6 8.6
v3adv 10.7 10.4 37.1 10.1 12.9
IRv2 12.8 13.6 6.1 29.3 7.0
IRv2adv 8.0 8.0 7.7 8.3 15.0
Top 5
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E GRADIENT ALIGNED ADVERSARIAL SUBSPACES FOR THE `∞ NORM
Trame`r et al. (2017) consider the following task for a given model h: for a (correctly classified)
point x, find k orthogonal vectors {r1, . . . , rk} such that ‖ri‖2 ≤  and all the x+ ri are adversarial
(i.e., argmaxh(x+ ri) 6= ytrue). By linearizing the model’s loss function, this reduces to finding k
orthogonal vectors ri that are maximally aligned with the model’s gradient g = ∇xL(h(x), ytrue).
Trame`r et al. (2017) left a construction for the `∞ norm as an open problem.
We provide an optimal construction for the `∞ norm, based on Regular Hadamard Matrices (Col-
bourn, 2010). Given the `∞ constraint, we find orthogonal vectors ri that are maximally aligned
with the signed gradient, sign(g). We first prove an analog of (Trame`r et al., 2017, Lemma 1).
Lemma 6. Let v ∈ {−1, 1}d and α ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there are k orthogonal vectors r1, . . . rn ∈
{−1, 1}d satisfying v>ri ≥ α · d. Then α ≤ k−
1
2 .
Proof. Let rˆi =
ri
‖ri‖2 =
ri√
d
. Then, we have
d = ‖v‖22 ≥
k∑
i=1
|v>rˆi|2 = d−1
k∑
i=1
|v>ri|2 ≥ d−1 · k · (α · d)2 = k · α2 · d , (12)
from which we obtain α ≤ k− 12 .
This result bounds the number of orthogonal perturbations we can expect to find, for a given align-
ment with the signed gradient. As a warm-up consider the following trivial construction of k or-
thogonal vectors in {−1, 1}d that are “somewhat” aligned with sign(g). We split sign(g) into k
“chunks” of size dk and define ri to be the vector that is equal to sign(g) in the i
th chunk and zero
otherwise. We obtain sign(g)>ri = dk , a factor
√
k worse than the the bound in Lemma 6.
We now provide a construction that meets this upper bound. We make use of Regular Hadamard
Matrices of order k (Colbourn, 2010). These are square matrices Hk such that: (1) all entries of Hk
are in {−1, 1}k; (2) the rows of Hk are mutually orthogonal; (3) All row sums are equal to
√
k.
The order of a Regular Hadamard Matrix is of the form 4u2 for an integer u. We use known
constructions for k ∈ {4, 16, 36, 64, 100}.
Lemma 7. Let g ∈ Rd and k be an integer for which a Regular Hadamard Matrix of order k exists.
Then, there is a randomized construction of k orthogonal vectors r1, . . . rn ∈ {−1, 1}d, such that
sign(g)>ri = d · k−1/2. Moreover, E[g>ri] = k−1/2 · ‖g‖1.
Proof. We construct k orthogonal vectors r1, . . . , rk ∈ {−1, 1}d, where ri is obtained by repeating
the ith row of Hk d/k times (for simplicity, we assume that k divides d. Otherwise we pad ri with
zeros). We then multiply each ri component-wise with sign(g). By construction, the k vectors
ri ∈ {−1, 1}d are mutually orthogonal, and we have sign(g)>ri = dk ·
√
k = d · k−1/2, which is
tight according to Lemma 6.
As the weight of the gradient g may not be uniformly distributed among its d components, we apply
our construction to a random permutation of the signed gradient. We then obtain
E[g>ri] = E
[ d∑
j=1
|g(j)| · sign(g(j)) · r(j)i
]
(13)
=
d∑
j=1
|g(j)| · E
[
sign(g(j)) · r(j)i
]
= k−
1/2 · ‖g‖1 . (14)
It can be shown that the bound in Lemma 7 can be attained if and only if the ri are constructed from
the rows of a Regular Hadamard Matrix (Colbourn, 2010). For general integers k for which no such
matrix exists, other combinatorial designs may be useful for achieving looser bounds.
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F ILLUSTRATIONS OF GRADIENT MASKING IN ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
In Section 3.3, we show that adversarial training introduces spurious curvature artifacts in the
model’s loss function around data points. As a result, one-shot attack strategies based on first-order
approximations of the model loss produce perturbations that are non-adversarial. In Figures 4 and 5
we show further illustrations of this phenomenon for the Inception v3adv model trained on ImageNet
by Kurakin et al. (2017b) as well as for the model Aadv we trained on MNIST.
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(a) Loss surface for model v3adv.
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(b) Zoom in of the loss for small 1, 2.
Figure 4: Additional illustrations of the local curvature artifacts introduced by adversarial
training on ImageNet. We plot the loss of model v3adv on samples of the form x
∗ = x+ 1 ·g+ 2 ·
g⊥, where g is the signed gradient of v3adv and g
⊥ is an orthogonal adversarial direction, obtained
from an Inception v4 model. The right-side plots are zoomed in versions of the left-side plots.
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(a) Loss surface for model Aadv (log-scale).
²1
0
0.03
²2
0
0.03
4 · 10−2
7 · 10−2
9 · 10−2
(b) Zoom in of the loss for small 1, 2.
Figure 5: Illustrations of the local curvature artifacts introduced by adversarial training on
MNIST. We plot the loss of model Aadv on samples of the form x
∗ = x + 1 · g + 2 · g⊥, where
g is the signed gradient of model Aadv and g
⊥ is an orthogonal adversarial direction, obtained from
model B. The right-side plots are zoomed in versions of the left-side plots.
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